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1 
TITLE TO TERRITORY AND JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW: THREE MODELS FOR A FRAUGHT RELATIONSHIP 
 
 
Abstract 
It is by now uncontroversial that states may owe human rights obligations to individuals 
outside their territory. The debate about extraterritoriality has so far focused on the concept 
and interpretation of jurisdiction. The role of territory in general, and title in particular, in the 
conceptual landscape has received less attention in comparison. This article aims to fill this 
gap by showing that (a) title to territory continues to shape interpretations of jurisdiction, and 
(b) that this should be avoided. To this end, the article first defines jurisdiction and title to 
territory. Jurisdiction is best understood as a threshold criterion that triggers human rights 
obligations of states towards particular individuals. Title to territory, on the other hand, is a 
set of claims to territory designed to uphold minimal stability. The paper then introduces three 
models – the approximation model, the differentiation model, and the separation model – of 
the relationship between title to territory and jurisdiction in international human rights law 
and evaluates them in light of their fit with the relational nature of human rights. The result is 
that the approximation and differentiation models – that is, those that maintain title’s influence 
on the interpretation of jurisdiction in various degrees – fail the success criterion, while the 
separation model satisfies it. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Does the United Kingdom owe human rights obligations to the population of Iraq because it is 
an occupying power? When the United States is listening in on the phone calls of a French 
citizen who lives in Belgium, does international human rights law, and thus the right to privacy, 
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apply? These are questions that implicate what is known as the extraterritorial application of 
human rights treaties. By now, it is uncontroversial that every international human rights 
instrument may impose at least some extraterritorial obligations, and that the concept of 
jurisdiction is central to this issue.1 I have no quarrel with either the idea of extraterritorial 
application of human rights treaties, nor with the idea that jurisdiction is the correct focus of 
this debate. Consequently, it is not the aim of this article to contest extraterritoriality, or to offer 
an account of jurisdiction. Instead, the present article focuses on the specific role notions of 
title play in the debate about extraterritoriality and the interpretation of jurisdiction. I argue that 
the notion of title to territory continues to shape the interpretation of jurisdiction – whatever 
the correct one may be – and that this should be avoided from the perspective of international 
human rights law because of the fundamentally opposed purposes of the two concepts.  
Let me first introduce the debates as I read them. Extraterritorial application means an 
instance where a state owes human rights obligations to an individual situated outside of its 
territory.2 As a matter of practice, the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is discussed against the backdrop 
of very specific circumstances.3 The upshot of this development is twofold. First, we have so 
far elaborated the meaning of jurisdiction in cases where intuition suggests that applying 
international human rights law is somehow exceptional.4 Second, the fact that territorial and 
jurisdictional relationships between states and individuals are discussed at the same time 
                                                 
1 See, eg, M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (2009); M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, 
and Policy (2011); K. Da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Selected Human Rights Treaties (2012). 
2 This definition is derived from, but not identical to, the one given in Milanovic, supra note 1, at 8, where it reads 
‘[e]xtraterritorial application simply means that at the time of the alleged violation of his or her human rights the 
individual in concerned is not physically located in the territory of the state party in question, a geographical area 
over which it has sovereignty or title.’ The change is to emphasise that it is important to know what the obligations 
are before we speak of violations. On this point see L. Raible, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the ECHR: Why Jaloud 
and Pisari should be Read as Game Changers’ [2016] European Human Rights Law Review 161, at 165-166. 
3 Military operations and armed conflict abroad are a prominent context for the extraterritorial application of, at 
least, civil and political rights. See, e.g., Banković v. Belgium, Decision of 12 December 2001, [2001] ECHR  
(Appl. No. 52207/99); Issa v. Turkey, Judgment of 16 November 2004, [2004] ECHR 629; Hassan v. UK, 
Judgment of 16 September 2014, [2014] ECHR (Appl. No. 29750/09) ; Al-Skeini v. UK, Judgment of 7 July 2008, 
(Appl. No. 55721/07). 
4 The European Court of Human Rights currently operates on this assumption: Al-Skeini v UK, supra note 3, at 
132. 
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implies that the concepts of jurisdiction and title are linked, without, specifying the nature of 
the relationship. Interestingly, however, whether there is or should be a particular relationship 
between the concepts of title to territory in public international law and jurisdiction in 
international human rights law specifically, has not gained much attention.5 This is true even 
though there are quite a few instances suggesting that underlying assumptions about this 
relationship are actually important. Consider the following provisions and their interpretation 
by way of example. 
Human rights instruments make reference to both territory and jurisdiction in different 
combinations. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example 
mentions both concepts in its Article 2, which provides that ‘[e]ach State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject 
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.’6 A strictly textual 
interpretation would mean that a state needs to hold title to territory and exercise jurisdiction 
cumulatively, and at the same time in order for the ICCPR to apply. The Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), however, has interpreted this formulation disjunctively: it found that ‘and’ 
actually means ‘or’.7 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) does not mention either of the concepts in its provision on general state obligations. 
The relevant Article 2 instead addresses international assistance and cooperation,8 while the 
                                                 
5 S. Wallace and C. Mallory, ‘Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to the Conflict in Ukraine’ 
(2016) University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper 48/2016 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845407> is 
an exception to this rule. However, it is less concerned with the principle of the matter and more with the 
application of the incoherent case law to the situation in Eastern Ukraine. 
6 Emphasis my own. 
7 HRC, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations on States Parties of the Covenant, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add.13 (26 May 2004), at 10-11. For an analysis of the drafting history of the provision 
see Gondek, supra note 1, at 92-105.  
8 On the implications for extraterritoriality see ibid., at 316-28; M. Gibney and S. Skogly, ‘Transnational human 
rights obligations’ (2010) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 781, at 790-91; O. De Schutter et al., ‘Commentary to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights’ (2012) 34 Human Rights Quarterly 1084; M. E. Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation and the Law of 
International Cooperation’ in Malcolm Langford et al. (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial 
Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (2013). More generally see: M. Craven, The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (1995), at 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the ICESCR imposes obligations that are 
‘essentially territorial.’9 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention), 
in yet another variation, relies on jurisdiction alone to demarcate its application. Article 1 of 
the ECHR reads as follows: ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.’ An analysis of 
the drafting history of the ECHR, however, shows that jurisdiction was chosen as opposed to 
notions of nationality. The use of the phrase ‘residing within [the state’s] territory’ was 
discussed but ultimately dismissed and replaced with ‘within [the state’s] jurisdiction.’10 The 
reason was to prevent the move from one problematic limitation of the reach of fundamental 
rights – nationals – to another one – residents.11  
This short list illustrates two important aspects of the area that shape this article. First, 
they exemplify that the relationship between a state’s title to territory and its jurisdiction is 
frequently invoked, but rarely expressly addressed. Second, the examples illustrate that a 
number of potential relationships seem to be contemplated. The ICCPR (but not the HRC’s 
interpretation) seems to suggest that territory and jurisdiction are cumulative, implying that 
they are – at core – different. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the HRC’s take on the text 
of the ICCPR is inadequate or wrong.12 For present purposes, this example should only be 
taken to illustrate that different interpretations of the ICCPR do not just imply different 
accounts of jurisdiction, but also entail different implications for the relationship between title 
                                                 
144-50; M. Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2003), at 370-77.  
9 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, at para. 112. 
10 Collected Edition of the “Travaux Préparatoires”of the European Convention on Human Rights (1976) Vol. 
3, at 200. 
11 See further the analysis in Gondek, supra note 1, at 84-92. 
12 In fact, I think that the interpretation of ‘and’ as ‘or’ is perfectly plausible, and at least not less so than the 
suggestion that jurisdiction and territory are different criteria to be met cumulatively. For arguments on the details 
of which interpretation is preferable see, eg, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No 52/1979, Views of 29 
July 1981, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, (Christian Tomuschat, Separate Opinion); Gondek, supra note 1, at 
92-108; Milanovic, supra note 1, at 222-227; M. Den Heijer and R. Lawson, ‘Extraterritorial Human Rights and 
the Concept of ‘Jurisdiction’’ in M. Langford et al. (eds), Global Justice, State Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (2013), at 161-162. 
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and jurisdiction in international human rights law. The ICESCR, on the other hand, invokes 
neither of the concepts as relevant, while the ICJ thought that territory is essential. There are 
instances where both the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) and academic 
commentators insist that jurisdiction is ‘primarily territorial’, which would mean that 
jurisdiction is both logically and normatively connected to national territory.13 At the same 
time, the same Court and the same authors also claim that jurisdiction in international human 
rights law is the very exception of territoriality, implying that jurisdiction does not only flow 
from territory, but at the same time constitutes a value that justifies its exceptions.14 This is a 
peculiar connection of claims, as they cannot both be true at the same time. The fact that it is 
not only present but common suggests that assumptions about the relationship between title to 
territory and the meaning of jurisdiction are fundamentally relevant to the confusion 
surrounding extraterritoriality. 
The starting point of this article is thus that the discussion of the relationship of the 
concepts of jurisdiction and title to territory could benefit from a conceptually coherent 
approach. In other words, the different contentions and assumptions should be organized into 
categories. In order to do so, I start by looking at what international law has to say about 
jurisdiction, as understood in international human rights law, and territory, respectively. The 
unsurprising, yet important, conclusion of this survey in section 2 is that the two concepts serve 
different normative purposes and that they are thus not the same and should be treated 
accordingly. However, this does not yet mean that title cannot or should not play a role in 
conceptualizing jurisdiction. 
                                                 
13 See, eg, Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 59; V. P. Tzevelekos, ‘Reconstructing the Effective Control 
Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights Breaches: Direct Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and 
Concurrent Responsibility’ (2014) 36 Michigan Journal of International Law 129, 129-30; M. Gondek, 
‘Extraterritorial Application of The European Convention on Human Rights: Territorial Focus in the Age of 
Globalization?’52 Netherlands International Law Review 349, 360 
14 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 67; Tzevelekos, supra note 13, at 142-43; Gondek, supra note 13, at 359, 
70. 
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Thus, section 3 introduces three models to organize the relationship of these different 
legal concepts at the stage of establishing human rights obligations of states and the yardstick 
against which they will be evaluated. The approximation model captures the idea that 
jurisdiction in international human rights law should mirror a concept of title. The 
differentiation model contends that the criteria that make up jurisdiction should be different 
depending on whether an alleged human rights violation takes place within or outside of a 
state’s territory. The separation model, in turn, insists on conceptual distinctiveness. The 
section also suggests that the models should be evaluated against their fit with the relational 
nature of human rights. This means that any model needs to fit with the fact that international 
legal human rights are dependent on, and create a normative relationship between the right 
holder and the bearer of ensuing obligations. 
Sections 4, 5, and 6 look at the three main models – approximation, differentiation, and 
separation – in turn. The discussion of the approximation and differentiation models suggests 
that title is alive and well in interpretations of jurisdiction. In order to show that this is a 
mistake, and that title should not influence the interpretation of jurisdiction, each model is 
evaluated against its fit with the relational nature of human rights. I argue that the 
approximation and differentiation models fail on this criterion, while the separation model fares 
best. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Jurisdiction, territory, and international law 
The concepts of jurisdiction and territory are widely made use of and referred to in public 
international law in general and in international human rights law in particular. This section 
first considers the meaning of jurisdiction through the particular lens of international human 
rights law. This limitation of scope is necessary for a simple reason: there are many meanings 
of jurisdiction in international law.15 The one that is of interest here is the threshold criterion 
                                                 
15 On this point and jurisdiction in international law generally see, e.g., R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: 
Clarifying the Basic Concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 735; A. Mills, ‘Rethinking 
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that must be met by a state in relation to an individual in order for human rights obligations to 
arise in the first place.16 In the context of general public international law this is a peculiar, if 
not marginal meaning of the term.17 It is important that this article should not be taken to 
address any of the other, more prevalent meanings. 
Second, territory will be considered in the context of the norms of international law that 
regulate title to territory by states.18 Again, a note of caution is warranted: this paper only 
describes the relevant aspects of public international law and draws some conclusions on its 
implications and effects. It does not, therefore, systematically describe, let alone evaluate, the 
legal regime against any justifications of territorial rights.19 After outlining both of these areas, 
the section concludes that the concepts of territory and jurisdiction in the relevant sense have 
very different purposes. They should thus be distinguished meticulously and any postulated 
relationship of these concepts, while not excluded by their distinctiveness, needs to be 
approached with care. 
2.1. Jurisdiction and international human rights law 
Much like the relationship between territory and jurisdiction, the one between jurisdiction and 
international human rights law is a fraught one.20 The main reason seems to be that jurisdiction 
                                                 
Jurisdiction in International Law’ (2014) 84 British Yearbook of International Law 187; Cedric Ryngaert, 
Jurisdiction in International Law (2nd edn, 2015). 
16 See, e.g., Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, supra note 12, at paras. 12.2 and 12.3; S. Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality 
of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction 
Amounts to’ (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 857. 
17 Most works dealing with jurisdiction in international law in general terms omit it entirely. See Mills, supra note 
15, at 194 (fn 22); Ryngaert, supra note 15, at 20. 
18 On title to territory in international law see generally M. N. Shaw (ed.), Title to Territory (2005); J. Crawford, 
The Creation of States in International Law (2nd edn, 2006); M. N. Shaw, International Law (7th edn, 2014) 352-
85. 
19 Others have done so much more stringently and persuasively than I could. See, e.g., D. Miller, ‘Territorial 
Rights: Concept and Justification’ (2012) 60 Political Studies 252; F. R. Tesón, ‘The Mystery of Territory’ (2015) 
32 Social Philosophy and Policy 25-50; L. Lo Coco, ‘The Grounds of Territory’ (PhD Thesis, King’s College 
London 2016). 
20 There are about as many interpretations of the precise criteria of jurisdiction in this regard as there are judicial 
bodies and authors. See, e.g., the different takes in O. De Schutter, ‘Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from 
the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2006) 6 Baltic Yearbook of International Law 183; H. King, ‘The 
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of States’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 521; S. Miller, 
‘Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the 
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has many meanings.21 In international (as opposed to domestic) law alone jurisdiction may 
refer to the competence of a court, or that of a state. It can denote the right of a state to enact 
domestic laws or to enforce them.22 Because jurisdiction means so many different things, there 
are numerous potential distinctions to be drawn out. However, the crucial one in the current 
context is this: jurisdiction as traditionally (and still usually) conceived of in international law 
is a question of right,23 whereas jurisdiction in international human rights law is a question of 
duty. This powerful thought requires some unpacking. 
I owe the clear expression of the idea to Mills.24 He argues that jurisdiction in 
international law can and should no longer be conceptualized as merely a matter of rights and 
powers, but also needs to be analysed as a question of duty. However, his concern is a different 
one from mine. He makes the argument that there are circumstances where the exercise of state 
jurisdiction in the traditional sense of an authority to regulate may be a duty rather than a 
right.25 That is, his argument concerns the lack of discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction, but 
the underlying conception of jurisdiction as regulatory authority – that is, a right – is not 
affected. In the context of international human rights law, on the other hand, the distinction 
between jurisdiction as a question of right and jurisdiction as a matter of duty is more 
fundamental on a conceptual level. Let me explain. 
                                                 
European Convention’ (2010) 20 European Journal of International Law 1223; Milanovic, supra note 1; Besson, 
supra note 16; De Schutter et al., supra note 8. 
21 For an outline of potential interpretations and the confusion they have sown in international human rights law 
see Milanovic, supra note 1, at 19-41. 
22 Ryngaert, supra note  9-10 
23 See, e.g., C. Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in M. D. Evans (ed.), International Law (3rd edn, 2010), at 309-10; J. 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, 2012), at 204-06, 456-57; Ryngaert, supra 
note 15. 
24 Mills, supra note 15. For the same distinction, but not as general, see Milanovic, supra note 1, at 53, 118; see 
also Gondek, supra note 13, at 369-70. 
25 Mills, supra note 15, at 209-230. 
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Whenever jurisdiction features in international human rights treaties, it is generally (and 
arguably most aptly) thought of as a threshold criterion.26 That is, if a state is to have human 
rights obligations towards particular individuals that state must have jurisdiction over them. 
Only when this is established does it mean that the individuals are to have rights against that 
state and the state is to incur the respective human rights obligations.27 When a state has 
jurisdiction according to, say, the ECHR or the ICCPR, human rights obligations arise 
regardless of whether that state had a right to do or omit what it did. In Mills’ words: ‘A state 
in unlawful occupation of territory may thus be subject to jurisdictional obligations under 
human rights law, even though it lacks jurisdictional rights as a matter of general international 
law.’28 
It follows that, international human rights law is agnostic towards the question of whether 
a state acts lawfully or whether it respects the sovereignty of other states in ‘exercising’29 its 
jurisdiction.30 In addition, if and when a state meets the criteria of jurisdiction, that state then, 
strictly speaking, has no discretion regarding the applicability of its human rights obligations. 
Put differently: once jurisdiction is established, international human rights instruments apply 
and the question of whether the state accepts its obligations under any such instrument is 
irrelevant. And it is even less relevant whether said state has any jurisdictional rights over the 
same situation. As the argument unfolds, we will see that this distinction between jurisdiction 
as a question of right and jurisdiction as a question of duty is crucial. 
In sum, jurisdiction in international human rights law is a matter of duty in the sense that 
its sets out criteria (whatever those may be), that, when met, trigger human rights obligations 
                                                 
26 M. O’Boyle, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Comment on 
"Life after Bankovic”’ in Fons Coomans and Menno T. Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties (Intersentia 2004) 125; Milanovic 19; Besson 862. 
27 Besson 862-63 
28 Mills, supra note 15, at 194 fn 22 (emphasis in original). 
29 This phrasing is misleading because it suggests that a state is exercising a right or power when this need not 
necessarily be true. In my view, jurisdiction in international human rights law does not depend on whether it is 
exercised: Raible, supra note 1, at 165-166. 
30 Contra Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 59. See Milanovic, supra note 1, at 39-41. 
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of a state towards an individual. Accordingly, it is crucial at the very beginning of an inquiry 
into human rights violations: whether or not there is an obligation to be violated depends on 
whether the state had jurisdiction. This is important because no one, not even a state, can violate 
an obligation it does not have.31 While not always spelled out in this fashion, jurisdiction in 
international human rights law has the function and purpose to trigger obligations of states 
towards individuals.32 As we will see after the discussion of territory that is to follow, it is 
precisely this purpose that makes the relationship with territory more complicated than is 
sometimes acknowledged. 
2.2. Title to territory in public international law 
For our purposes, a brief and selective outline of international law of territory suffices.33 The 
three essential areas of interest are the following: the definition of a state, states’ territorial 
integrity, acquisition and loss of territory, and territory as a source of sovereignty. 
Traditionally, international law defines States as its subjects to consist of a defined territory 
with a permanent population ruled by an independent government.34 According to this, States 
are essentially territorial entities.35 Even though there are doubts as to how important territory 
really is as a separate criterion of statehood, ‘a certain coherent territory effectively governed’ 
remains central.36 
                                                 
31 On the relevance of this point see Raible, supra note 1, at 166. 
32 It could, and probably should, be argued that jurisdiction is thus an unfortunate choice of term for the purposes 
of human rights law. However, it seems it is what we are left with for now. 
33 This is a simplified account in order to keep distractions from the purpose of this paper to a minimum. For more 
on territory in international law see Shaw, Title to Territory, supra note 18; Crawford, supra note 18; Crawford, 
supra note 23, at 203-52; Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 352-400. 
34 See Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (signed 26 December 1933) 165 
LNTS 19. 
35 See Crawford, supra note 18, at 46-52; Tesón, supra note 19, at 28. The opposite, however, is not true. 
International law recognises categories of territories that do not form part of a state in this sense. See generally 
Crawford, supra note 23, at 203. 
36 Crawford, supra note 18, at 52. 
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When it comes to acquisition and transfer of territory of states international law treats it 
not entirely unlike property.37 States can acquire territory either originally or derivatively.38 
Original acquisition occurs when a state occupies territory, that is, when it yields relatively 
uncontested and effective jurisdictional powers39 in a particular territory.40 States acquire 
territory derivatively through cession. The reason for a cession can be a sale or a political 
decision by the ceding state. However, in both cases the derivatively acquired title is only valid 
if the title of the ceding state was valid as well. The upshot is that title, understood as ‘the 
validity of claims to territorial sovereignty against other states’,41 is central in any case.42 This 
last statement illustrates that the notion of title to territory is intimately linked to sovereignty, 
as title comprises its ‘essence’.43 
The concept of title in international law exhibits a strong preference for the status quo.44 
This is manifested the following principles, among others. First, consistent use of and effective 
exercise of state functions over a territory, are central notions that almost always bear a decisive 
effect in determining such title.45 Second, international law upholds territorial integrity of 
(existing) states, as evidenced by article 2(4) of the UN Charter.46 The principle is particularly 
important in discussions about secessions.47 Further evidence of the importance of territorial 
integrity may be found in the fact that coerced territorial transfers – such as conquests – while 
prohibited today, were (and are) the source of valid title to territory if they occurred before 
                                                 
37 Crawford, supra note 23, at 216, but see the note of caution at 204; Tesón, supra note 19, at 28. 
38 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep. 12, at paras. 79-80. 
39 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. US) (1928) RIAA 829. Note that this is precisely not the prevailing 
meaning of jurisdiction in international human rights law. 
40 Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 363-72; Tesón, supra note 19, at 28. 
41 Crawford, supra note 23, at 212. 
42 Ibid., at 216-17. 
43 Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 354. 
44 Tesón, supra note 19, at 29. 
45 Shaw, Title to Territory, supra note 18, at xxiii-xxiv; Tesón, supra note 19, at 29. 
46 See further M. W. Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force’ 
(2001) 55 International Organization 215. On the acquisition of territory by newly creating/ed states see generally 
Crawford, supra note 18; Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 355-58. 
47 L. Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-determination: A Territorial Interpretation’ (1991) 16 Yale Journal of 
International Law 177. 
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1928, when the Kellogg-Briand Pact48 was signed.49 The fact that international law concerning 
territory favours the status quo by focusing on historical effectiveness50 is a consequence of its 
purpose. It performs the important function of creating and upholding international stability. 
In doing so, international law in practice avoids the crucial questions of legitimacy and acts as 
a workable arbiter in case of territorial disputes.51 The focus on effectiveness and the favouring 
of the status quo might be morally flawed,52 but make sense in light of the purpose of this area 
of law. 
Contrast this analysis with what was said about jurisdiction in international human rights 
law by revisiting the distinction between jurisdiction as right and jurisdiction as a trigger of 
duty.53 Title to territory is about the validity of claims by a particular State. It is related to the 
conception of jurisdiction as powers and rights, as regulatory authority of states, dependent as 
it is, on the effective exercise of exactly these powers. In other words, jurisdiction here refers 
to a right of a state to exercise regulatory authority. It allocates rights, and is thus agnostic as 
to whether a state actually exercises its authority.54 However, jurisdiction in this sense has little 
to no obvious resemblance to jurisdiction as it is understood in international human rights law. 
One could say that either or both of these legal conceptions are impractical, or morally flawed. 
However, this is a moot point. The opposing conceptions are simply a consequence of the 
purpose of each area of law. The international law on territory, as we have seen, maintains a 
minimum of stability by upholding exclusive claims by States. The purpose of jurisdiction in 
international human rights law, on the other hand, is to act as a threshold criterion for human 
                                                 
48 Also known as Pact of Paris. Formally: General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National 
Policy (signed 27 August 1928) 94 LNTS 57. 
49 See Crawford, supra note 23, at 216. 
50 To my mind, it is in light of this no coincidence that Crawford treats effectiveness as the decisive feature of 
statehood as such: Crawford, supra note 18, at 37-95. 
51 Tesón, supra note 19, at 28-29. 
52 As a consequence, many philosophical justifications of territorial rights are in opposition to international law. 
See, e.g., ibid., at 30-31; Lo Coco, supra note 19. 
53 See section 2.1 supra. 
54 Although, and this is the heart of Mills’ argument, there are areas where should now be acknowledged that the 
exercise of jurisdiction in this sense may not only be a right, but also a duty. See Mills, supra note 15, at 209-230. 
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rights obligations. Accordingly, and unlike the law on territory, it is not only guided by 
practical considerations, but it also relies on moral accounts of what human rights law does and 
is. 
None of this is to say a priori that the two concepts have nothing to do with each other or 
that interpretations of jurisdiction that rely on notions inspired by or related to title to territory 
are necessarily flawed. Similarly, I have not yet shown that there are, as a matter of fact, 
interpretations of jurisdiction that do rely on title. What this section has shown is the following. 
Title to territory and jurisdiction in international human rights law serve different purposes. 
These different purposes call for a careful analysis of the relationship and for criteria to arbitrate 
between different models of said relationship. The next section takes up this task. I introduce 
three models to organise existing claims about the relationship of jurisdiction and territory as 
well as an argument in favour of the relational nature of human rights as an evaluative 
yardstick.  
3. Three models and their evaluation 
3.1. Models 
The introduction to this paper mentioned a few examples of contentions about or relating to 
the relationship of territory and jurisdiction. We have reached the stage of organising these 
claims into models. The approximation model is one that defends that jurisdiction in 
international human rights law is for all intents and purposes a mirror of title to territory. The 
differentiation model bundles claims to the effect that the criteria making up jurisdiction 
depend on whether the relevant situation is found within or outside of the territory of the state, 
whose jurisdiction is in question. The separation model maintains that jurisdiction in 
international human rights law and title to territory are conceptually entirely separate and that 
similarities – if any – are not due to the fact the jurisdiction is related to title. Not present as a 
model of the relationship is the idea that human rights treaties apply only within a state’s 
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territory. The reason is that this particular contention to my mind has already been thoroughly 
analysed and rejected by leading authors in this field.55 The same is not true for the models 
discussed here. 
Importantly, and in line with the purpose of jurisdiction in international human rights law 
identified above,56 the models I propose address the stage of the establishment of the human 
rights obligations of a state. The models represent positions along the spectrum of how much 
title to territory impacts (or should impact) the meaning of jurisdiction, conceptually speaking. 
Put differently, these models are claims about how the concept of title to territory affects the 
criteria making up the meaning of jurisdiction in international human rights law.57 An example 
of such a claim is that, depending on whether or not an alleged human rights violation takes 
place within or outside a state’s territory, different thresholds should apply. These models serve 
as organizing tools for the exploration of the following questions: How and why does title to 
territory linger on in interpretations of jurisdiction? And, if it does, should it? 
It is worth noting that not all claims about the relationship between the concepts of title 
to territory and jurisdiction are dealt with in these models. In other words, not all claims about 
the relationship pertain to whether title and the trigger of obligations have anything in common. 
By way of example consider Besson’s idea that a State’s jurisdiction is presumed in relation to 
individuals present within domestic territory of that state.58 This is a claim about how territory 
and, ultimately, title influence how a court should assess whether or not a State has jurisdiction. 
                                                 
55 See, e.g., E. Benvenisti, ‘The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied 
Territories’ (1992) 26 Israel Law Review 24; O. Ben-Naftali and Y. Shany, ‘Living in Denial: The Application of 
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories’ (2004) 37 Israel Law Review 17; R. Wilde, ‘Legal Black Hole – 
Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights’ (2004) 26 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 739; Gondek, supra note 1, at 368; Milanovic, supra note 1, at 58-61. For an 
opposing view regarding times of armed conflict and occupation see M. J. Dennis, ‘Application of Human Rights 
Treaties Extraterritoriality in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 119. 
56 Section 2.1 supra. 
57 It would be perfectly possible to investigate the opposite perspective where one would ask how much the 
concept of title to territory in international law can or should be influenced by jurisdiction in international human 
rights law. However, this is not the point of this paper. 
58 Besson, supra note, at 876-77 (emphasis my own). 
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It is, in Besson’s words, a question of evidence rather than concept.59 While this is an 
interesting and important issue, the present article does not address it. Instead, it focuses on the 
question of whether and how title to territory can or should inform the interpretation of 
jurisdiction in international human rights law as a trigger of obligations. 
3.2. Method of evaluation: the relational nature of human rights 
A note on the method of evaluation is warranted. The use of models is helpful because it allows 
to bundle different claims about jurisdiction according to how they make use of title to territory. 
In turn, this illustrates that title to territory continues to influence the interpretation of 
jurisdiction. However, the article also aims to show that a conflation, or even unwarranted 
combination, of title and jurisdiction should be avoided. In order to analyse which of the three 
models is preferable, we need to know what makes a model of the relationship of jurisdiction 
and territory successful. 
I submit that an evaluation has to be connected to a theory of international legal human 
rights, and in particular their relational nature. The reason is that the impact of notions of title 
on jurisdiction in international human rights law affect the stage in the analysis that concerns 
the establishment of human rights obligations of states in the first place. That is, we are 
interested in how international human rights law allocates obligations to states, and how this 
allocation is justified. 
The allocation and justification of obligations is a necessary part of human rights. As 
rights, their very purpose is to give the right holder a claim against the duty bearer.60 Rights, 
and thus human rights, need to explain and justify two things in particular. First, they need to 
explain why an agent other than the right-holder must shoulder the burdens of ensuing 
                                                 
59 Ibid., at 876 
60 See generally, W. N. Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 
23 Yale Law Journal 16. See further L. Wenar, ‘The Nature of Rights’ (2005) 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
223; L. Wenar, ‘The Nature of Claim-Rights’ (2013) 123 Ethics 202. 
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obligations for the sake of the former. Second, human rights need to be supplied with reasons 
that justify the allocation of these obligations to one duty-bearer (or a set of duty-bearers) rather 
than another. In the context of extraterritoriality, this means that we need to ask why 
international human rights law would insist on the allocation of duties to a particular state, be 
it the territorial one or not. In other words, the issue of extraterritoriality is really a question of 
how to identify the relevant duty-bearer in relation to a particular right-holder. 
However, international legal human rights are relational in more than one sense: they are 
normative relationships between a right-holder and a duty-bearer, 61 but they are also dependent 
on a pre-existing relationship between the two. The latter relationship is what allocates the 
arising obligations to a particular duty-bearer (or duty-bearers). It is also what justifies this 
allocation. When we consider the meaning of jurisdiction in international human rights law and 
how the concept of title to territory should influence it we are concerned with characterizing 
that pre-existing relationship.62 
This is true regardless of which particular account of international legal human rights one 
favours. So far, it seems, authors who disagree on the nature and function of international 
human rights also disagree on the precise meaning of jurisdiction. Contrast the views of 
Milanovic and Besson, for example. Milanovic bases his analysis of extraterritoriality on an 
understanding of human rights that treats them as (a) enshrining outcomes that are important 
for individuals’ wellbeing, and thus desirable in and of themselves, 63 and (b) allocating 
resulting obligations to the actor who has the capacity to bring about the desired outcome at 
                                                 
61 On the importance of the identification of the duty-bearer in general see, e.g., S. Besson, ‘The Bearers of Human 
Rights’ Duties and Responsibilities for Human Rights: A Quiet (R)Evolution?’ (2015) 32 Social Philosophy and 
Policy 244. 
62 I have argued elsewhere that jurisdiction is best understood as political power. See Raible, supra note 1, at 166-
168. However, the purpose of jurisdiction remains the same regardless of which particular interpretation one 
prefers, and it is this purpose that is decisive. 
63 Milanovic explicitly endorses this view. But he does not do so in the same place where he is interpreting the 
meaning of jurisdiction. See Milanovic, supra note 15, at 107, 109. 
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the least cost.64 This combination of claims it is what allows him to differentiate between the 
extraterritoriality of negative and positive human rights obligations in his now famous “third 
model”.65 
Besson, on the other hand, treats human rights as rooted in the equal political status of 
individuals and thus tied to political membership.66 Her account stresses that, because of this 
reliance on political equality, some form of membership in a political community is required 
if an individual is to have claims against institutions of that community. This impacts directly 
on her account of the meaning of jurisdiction, which she argues is best understood as de facto 
legal and political authority.67 
None of this shows which account of human rights, if any, is preferable. But it does show 
that the following. While the details of the interpretation of jurisdiction hinge on the substantive 
account of human rights employed, jurisdiction’s function does not. Any plausible account 
needs to explain who the right-holder is, who bears corresponding duties, and how this 
allocation is justified. In other words, regardless of what theory of human rights one prefers, it 
is necessary to allocate human rights obligations, and this is what jurisdiction is about. For this 
reason, the models introduced here are evaluated against their fit with the relational nature of 
human rights. That is, a good model of the relationship of jurisdiction and territory will fit with 
the reason why the interpretation of jurisdiction is so central. The better the model fits, the 
more successful it is. 
                                                 
64 Implicitly: ibid., at ch 4. Explicitly: M. Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy 
in a Digital Age’ (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 81, at 111. For more on the least-cost-principle 
and how it allocates duties see L. Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’ in T. Pogge (ed.), Freedom from 
Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (2007). 
65 Milanovic has been criticized – again implicitly – for not following through on the capacity plus least-cost-
principle. See Y. Shany, ‘Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in 
International Human Rights Law’ (2013) 7 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 47, at 61-64. 
66 See generally S. Besson, ‘Human Rights and Democracy in a Global Context: Decoupling and Recoupling’ 
(2011) 4 Ethics & Global Politics 19. 
67 Besson, supra note 16, at 862-866. 
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4. The Approximation Model 
An approximation or mirroring of jurisdiction to title to territory is most clearly visible where 
the claim is that jurisdiction is ‘primarily territorial.’68 This assertion does rarely stand alone, 
however. Sometimes it goes hand in hand with the idea that jurisdiction, as a consequence of 
its territoriality, cannot mean anything else than effective control over territory and that this is 
true for extraterritorial jurisdiction as well.69 It is also sometimes followed by the claim that as 
a consequence of its territoriality jurisdiction must be limited by the sovereign rights of other 
states.70 
The upshot of these propositions is that jurisdiction in international human rights law, 
even if it is conceptualized as a threshold criterion for the treaties’ application, is essentially 
and necessarily inspired by the criteria usually thought to establish title to territory, the most 
important of which is effective governance.71 In other words, the consequence of these claims 
is that jurisdiction as a threshold criterion should be a close approximation of at least some of 
the criteria generally used to establish title to territory. What follows unpacks the claim that 
jurisdiction is best understood as an approximation of the title-inspired criterion of effective 
control over territory and that jurisdiction as approximation of title needs to be exclusive. 
Consider, first, the problem of effective control over territory as a criterion for 
jurisdiction. The ECtHR introduced it in Banković v. Belgium,72 and it remains alive and well 
in later judgments, such as Al-Skeini v. UK.73 The Banković decision concerned the applications 
of individuals whose relatives were killed in the bombing of a radio and television station in 
Belgrade. The ECtHR found their case inadmissible because – among other reasons – the states 
                                                 
68 (In)famously coined in Banković v. Belgium, supra note, at 59. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall, supra note, at 109. See further R. Wilde, ‘Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial 
Test in Certain Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 40 Israel Law Review 503; Miller, supra note 20; Tzevelekos, 
supra note 13. 
69 See generally Tzevelekos, supra note 13. 
70 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 59. 
71 See section 2.1 supra. 
72 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3. 
73 Al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 3, at 138-140. 
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who carried out the aerial attack lacked effective control over the territory in question.74 The 
basic idea of this interpretation of jurisdiction is that one of the instances where a state party to 
the ECHR incurs human rights obligations towards individuals abroad is the case of effective 
control over territory.75 
This interpretation of jurisdiction has been heavily criticized by scholars for a range of 
different reasons. Milanovic is not entirely opposed, but nevertheless suggests that it should 
not apply to negative human rights obligations;76 at least in part because the effective control 
criterion produces arbitrary results.77 Tzevelekos goes further and argues that the criterion does 
not only produce arbitrary outcomes, but also lacks a basis in in the Convention as it can only 
be traced to the law of state responsibility.78 Shany considers the criterion as developed in 
Banković arbitrary because it does not seem to follow from any cogent normative principles to 
speak of.79 In sum, the criticism so far is that effective control over territory as an interpretation 
of jurisdiction in international human rights law is not satisfactory in terms of the outcomes it 
entails. 
To complement these criticisms, I want to draw attention to the implicit use of the 
approximation model. Constructing jurisdiction in international human rights law as effective 
control over territory usually80 starts with the assumption that jurisdiction is as a virtual 
extension of title to territory.81 This is apparent in the first step of this type of analysis, namely 
                                                 
74 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 75. 
75 This spatial model is just one of the concepts the Court currently operates with. The other one is the personal 
model, where authority over individuals is decisive. However, I have argued elsewhere that these were never 
meaningfully separate and that the Court has recently (hopefully) confirmed this, albeit implicitly. See Raible, 
supra note 1, at 164-165. 
76 Milanovic, supra note 1, at 209-22. 
77 Ibid., at 170-72 
78 For a summary of his view see Tzevelekos, supra note 13, at 133-34 
79 Shany, supra note 65, at 60. 
80 A notable exception is Besson, who aligns herself with the separation model (see section 6 below) but 
nevertheless argues for jurisdiction to contain an element of effective control (among other elements). See Besson, 
supra note 16, at 872. 
81 This is in addition to the ubiquitous conflation of jurisdiction and state responsibility. See further Milanovic, 
supra note 1, at 41-52. For an opposite view see J. M. Rooney, ‘The Relationship between Jurisdiction and 
Attribution after Jaloud v. Netherlands’ (2015) 62 Netherlands International Law Review 407. 
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the claim that jurisdiction is primarily territorial.82 There are two ensuing problems with this 
starting point. First, it assumes – wrongly83 – that jurisdiction in international human rights law 
is a question of right, that is, of what a state has the international legal authority to do. This 
cluster of meanings of jurisdiction is connected to title to territory in a particular way: they are 
perceived to flow from it because territory is both a precondition and a source of sovereignty 
and jurisdiction is a particular subset of sovereign rights.84 This first misunderstanding about 
the function of jurisdiction leads to the second one, which is to derive the criteria necessary for 
jurisdiction from the criteria to establish title to territory. In other words, the next step is to 
mirror the test used to establish original title to territory – that is – habitual and effective control 
and exercise of jurisdictional functions.85 Effective control over territory is the interpretation 
of jurisdiction that follows from this model. 
Further, there is the idea that jurisdiction in international human rights law is both limited 
by and limiting the sovereignty of other States.86 It builds on the misunderstanding of 
jurisdiction as a right as opposed to a question of duty: it can only possibly limit or even 
displace the rights of other states if it is a right itself. The connection of this claim to the notion 
of title to territory is that it strives to mirror not only the criteria to be met for original 
acquisition of territory but also the purpose of the legal regime governing them. Even if the 
claims to territorial title are usually relative and in disputes title is awarded to whichever state 
has the better or best claim, the very purpose of the notion of title is that – once awarded or 
accepted – it is exclusive.87 Just like the purpose of sovereignty, the purpose of this 
understanding is to maintain stability in a statist order. The question thus becomes: should this 
                                                 
82 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 59; Gondek, supra note 13, at 360; Tzevelekos, supra note 13, at 129-30. 
83 See section 2.2 supra. 
84 Crawford, supra note 23, at 204; Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 352-54. See also N. Bhuta, ‘The 
Frontiers of Extraterriotriality: Human Rights Law as Global Law’ in N. Bhuta (ed.), The Frontiers of Human 
Rights (2016). 
85 Crawford, supra note 23, at 225-26; Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 363-72 
86 Banković v. Belgium, supra note 3, at 59. 
87 Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 354-55. 
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purpose, which is almost entirely foreign to international human rights law, influence our 
understanding of jurisdiction as a threshold criterion to apply it?88  
The success criterion introduced above provide an answer. I argue that the approximation 
model does not fulfil this criterion for the following reasons. It does not take into account the 
crucial difference between the exercise of jurisdiction as a right and the use of jurisdiction as a 
criterion for the application of a duty.89 This means, in turn, that it does not fit a relational 
account of human rights. The reason is that the approximation model is unable to treat 
jurisdiction as a threshold criterion for the application of human rights because it ultimately 
subordinates jurisdiction to territory instead of using title to inform the meaning of jurisdiction. 
In terms of reasoning the law of territory cannot serve as an inspiration to characterize a 
relationship between a state and individuals. 
None of this is to say that an interpretation of jurisdiction in international human rights 
law cannot ever rely on a notion of control over territory. It does mean, however, that in 
reaching this conclusion, the idea that jurisdiction is an extension of territory obscures rather 
than clarifies what should be at stake. The essence of title, as it were, cannot and should not be 
introduced into the interpretation of jurisdiction. The verdict on the approximation model is 
thus that it fails our evaluation and that we should look elsewhere when seeking to elucidate 
the relationship between jurisdiction and title to territory.  
5. The Differentiation Model 
The differentiation model maintains that jurisdiction as found in international human rights law 
should be determined with reference to different criteria depending on whether or not the State 
in question has title to the territory where the alleged human rights violation takes place. 
Versions of the differentiation model include the idea that title to territory makes up for criteria 
                                                 
88 But see Bhuta, supra note 84, who argues that human rights actually rely on a statist system and states’ legal 
systems. 
89 See section 2.1 supra. 
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of jurisdiction that are not fulfilled; for example a lack in actual power by the state over territory 
or a situation in general.90 The differentiation model could also result in the claim that as long 
as a state has title to a particular territory, it does not need jurisdiction in order for its human 
rights obligations to arise. Finally, it could translate into the contention that title always results 
in jurisdiction, regardless of whether the latter’s criteria are met or not, while the same is not 
true extraterritorially. This section unpacks these claims and their consequences for the 
interpretation of jurisdiction before evaluating them against the criteria established above. 
Traces of all of these claims are most prominently found in the ECtHR judgments in 
Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia91 and Catan v. Moldova and Russia.92 In both cases, the Court 
had to determine who had jurisdiction in Transdniestria for the purposes of applying the ECHR. 
As a consequence of the conflict between Russia and Moldova following the dissolution of the 
USSR, Transdniestria declared itself the Moldovan Republic of Trasdniestria (MRT). 
However, the status of the territory remains unresolved. The MRT is not recognized as a state 
and Moldova maintains that the MRT is part of Moldovan territory.93 At the same time, the 
ECtHR considered it established that the MRT is under the effective authority and control of 
Russia.94 As the MRT is not party to the ECHR, the Court had to decide whether it was 
Moldova or Russia that had jurisdiction over the applicants, which in both cases alleged their 
human rights were violated in the MRT.95 
The ECtHR found that Russia had jurisdiction because of its effective authority within 
the MRT,96 which fits well with the case law discussed above.97 However, the Court also held 
that Moldova retained jurisdiction for the purposes of certain human rights obligations towards 
                                                 
90 For an argument to that effect see K. Mujezinović Larsen, ‘'Territorial Non-Application' of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2009) 78 Nordic Journal of International Law 73-93 
91 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, Judgment of 8 July 2004, [2004] ECHR (Rep. 2004-VII). 
92 Catan v. Moldova and Russia, Judgment of 19 October 2012, [2012] ECHR (Appl. No. 43370/04). 
93 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 91, at 2, 322-330. 
94 Ibid., at 386-394. 
95 Ibid., at 2: Catan v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 92, at 3. 
96 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 91, at 386-394. 
97 Section 4 supra. 
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individuals in the MRT even though it lacked effective control over the territory.98 Here is what 
the Court had to say about the latter finding in Ilaşcu: 
On the basis of all the material in its possession, the Court considers that the 
Moldovan Government, the only legitimate government of the Republic of 
Moldova under international law, does not exercise authority over part of its 
territory, namely that part which is under the effective control of the “MRT”. … 
However, even in the absence of effective control over the Transdniestrian 
region, Moldova still has a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention 
to take the diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power 
to take and are in accordance with international law to secure to the applicants 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention.99 
 
Admittedly, in the light of this article’s purpose and particularly from the point of view 
of public international law, this quote does not make a lot of sense. After all, whether or not a 
particular government is considered legitimate or whether a government as opposed to a state 
is recognized, has no necessary bearing on title to territory.100 What the Court may have meant 
to say instead becomes clearer upon consulting the relevant passages in Catan, however: 
Although Moldova has no effective control over the acts of the “MRT” in 
Transdniestria, the fact that the region is recognised under public international 
law as part of Moldova’s territory gives rise to an obligation, under Article 1 of 
the Convention… .101 
 
Again, the choice of words is unfortunate because it invites conflation of the notion of title 
with the concept of recognition of states.102 Nevertheless, in my view the most sensible 
interpretation of this latter statement is that the ECtHR means to say the following. Moldova 
has, as a matter of international law, title to the territory of the MRT and retains jurisdiction 
and human rights obligations towards its population, albeit only a subset, as a direct 
consequence of this fact. 
                                                 
98 Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 91, at 33-335. 
99 Ibid., at 330-331. 
100 For a summary on recognition of governments see Shaw, International Law, supra note 18, at 328-32. 
101 Catan v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 92, at 110 (citing Ilaşcu v. Moldova and Russia, supra note 91). 
102 On recognition of states see Crawford, supra note 18, at ch 1; J. Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of 
Recognition’ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 361; Shaw, International Law, supra note 
18, at 321-28. 
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This means that Moldova’s title to the territory comprising the MRT in the view of the 
Court made up in part for what Moldova lacked in actual control. In turn, this implies that as 
long as a state has title, the requirements for jurisdiction under the ECHR may be reduced or 
altered.103 The more general implication is that the concrete meaning of jurisdiction and its 
criteria actually differ depending on whether the state to be held accountable has title to the 
territory in question. In other words, the differentiation model differentiates between the 
criteria of jurisdiction within the territory a state has title to and the criteria of jurisdiction 
outside of it. 
How does the model fare in the context of the interpretation of jurisdiction when tested 
against our evaluative criterion? The main problem the differentiation model faces is the 
assumption that the relationship between individuals and states that allocates human rights 
duties is characterised by the state’s relationship with a particular territory. Much like the 
approximation model, the differentiation model conceptualises jurisdiction as a form of upshot 
of territory.104 It is only possible to claim that title makes up for whatever one lacks in 
jurisdiction if one also assumes that their criteria overlap and – importantly – have the same 
purpose.105 At this point, it becomes clear that title to territory has not yet been deployed to 
interpret jurisdiction in line with relational accounts of human rights. This would only be 
successful if one could first establish that title to territory is a vital part of the state’s relationship 
with individuals that justifies human rights.106 The differentiation model does not fit well with 
the relational nature of human rights for much the same reasons as the approximation model. 
This means that the differentiation model fails and – along with the conclusions in Ilaşcu and 
Catan – should be rejected.107 
                                                 
103 See also Mujezinović Larsen, supra note 90. 
104 See ibid., at 76-78, where he conflates jurisdiction as a right and jurisdiction as an issue of duty, while arguing 
overall, for what I would call the differentiation model. Cf. Milanovic, supra note 1, at 118. 
105 On the differing purposes of the two legal concepts see section 2. supra. 
106 This is what I hope to be a faithful extension of the view in Besson, supra note 16,at 860. 
107 Similar, but for different reasons: Milanovic, supra note 1, at 118. 
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To sum up, the differentiation and the approximation models both fail for similar 
underlying reasons. Problematically, these accounts confuse jurisdiction as a right with 
jurisdiction as a trigger of duties.108 The approximation model does so more openly and 
consistently than the differentiation model. However, both allow title to territory to largely 
dictate the criteria of jurisdiction without establishing that it captures something about the pre-
existing relationship between States and individuals necessary for human rights to apply. In 
other words, they fail to account for the purpose of jurisdiction and ultimately they cement 
rather than lift the confusion surrounding it. This leaves us with the separation model, which 
is considered next. 
6. The Separation Model 
The separation model maintains that jurisdiction in international human rights law and title to 
territory should be conceptually separated and that similarities – if any – should not be taken 
for granted, let alone established with a view to territory. This model thus results in the view 
that title to territory does not and should not impact criteria of jurisdiction. It follows that a 
state that has title to a particular territory does not necessarily have jurisdiction. And even if 
the criteria for both of these concepts end up being similar, the reason is not that title impacts 
the interpretation of jurisdiction. Say, for example, jurisdiction is interpreted to mean effective 
control over an area.109 In a paradigmatic instance of a State, this would mean that it has 
jurisdiction over the entire territory it has title to and in addition to that over any area it controls 
effectively through whatever means.110 As long as the reason for the adoption of these criteria 
is tailored to the purpose of each area of law and the results arrived at independently, this is 
still fall under the separation model. 
                                                 
108 See section 2.1 above. 
109 As mentioned above, this is not the only way it can or has been interpreted. But the ECtHR continues to hold 
that it is relevant: Al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 3, at 130-139. 
110 Examples include Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment (Preliminary Objections) of 23 March 1995, [1995] ECHR 
(Appl. No. 15318/89), at 60-64; Al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 3, at 130-139. 
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The last paragraph already implies that, in terms of result at least, instances of the 
separation model are widespread, even in the case law of the ECtHR.111 Beyond that, the HRC 
has been particularly clear. In Lopez Burgos it has been very forthcoming in basing the meaning 
of jurisdiction on a State’s relationship with an individual, leaving the notion of territory or 
title out of the equation.112 This fits perfectly well with its disjunctive interpretation of article 
2 ICCPR.113 Even Al-Skeini – the ECtHR’s (still) leading case on the principles of jurisdiction 
– can be interpreted to be arrived at independently of territory. This is true not only of the 
spatial model mentioned above, but in particular also of the personal model of jurisdiction, 
which is based on control over an individual instead of territory.114 
However, the Court still heads its statement of principles with what it refers to as ‘[t]he 
territorial principle’.115 This principle perpetuates the idea that jurisdiction in the ECHR flows 
from territory. In other words, the ECtHR reaches results that are disconnected from the 
substance of its reasoning. While I have argued elsewhere that a charitable interpretation of the 
ECtHR’s case law on extraterritoriality may remedy some of its flaws,116 I also think that the 
lack of discernible, adequate reasoning is an indication of serious problems with the case 
law.117 In particular, it means that (implicit) use of the approximation and differentiation 
models, and thus the failure to meet the success criteria postulated here, lingers on. The 
numerous inconsistencies in human rights adjudication this causes are a steep price to pay for 
the use of a seemingly comforting phrase such as the ‘territorial principle’. 
                                                 
111 In addition to the examples above see the following cases of the ECtHR: Issa v. Turkey, supra note 3, at 71; 
Hassan v. UK, supra note 3, at 74-80; Jaloud v. Netherlands, Judgment of 20 November 2014, [2014] ECHR 
(Appl. No. 47708/08), at 139-153; Pisari v. Moldova, , Judgment of 19 October 2015, [2015] ECHR (Appl. No. 
42139/12), at 33. 
112 Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, supra note 12, at 12.2 and 12.3.  
113 Section 1 supra. 
114 Al-Skeini v. UK, supra note 3, at 133-137. 
115 Ibid., at 130. 
116 Raible, supra note 1. 
117 L. Raible, ‘Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim 
Status, Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning’ (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 510, at 520-
524. 
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Among the authors defending, or at least adopting, what I call the separation model, 
Besson is the clearest in her reasons for doing so. She notes: 
The relational nature of jurisdiction between a subject and the authority needs to 
be stressed, as it corresponds to the relational nature of human rights between a 
right-holder and a duty-bearer. Article 1 ECHR situates human rights within a 
relationship of jurisdiction and makes them dependent on it: jurisdiction both 
requires the recognition of human rights normatively (jurisdiction as normative 
trigger of human rights) and provides the conditions for the corresponding duties 
to be feasible (jurisdiction as practical condition of human rights). Jurisdiction 
amounts, therefore, at once to a normative threshold and a practical condition for 
human rights.118 
 
I read this passage to mean that jurisdiction as a threshold criterion captures the relational 
nature of human rights as a particular category of norms.119 It thus has everything to do with 
the nature and function of international legal human rights and precisely nothing with whether 
or not a state has title to territory. Accordingly, she argues next that jurisdiction should be 
understood as a functional criterion with a territorial dimension.120 Put differently, the 
territorial dimension of jurisdiction is a consequence of the function of jurisdiction as described 
above, not the other way around. Finally, Besson also expressly rejects the differentiation 
model by saying that ‘… there are no reasons … why jurisdiction should be conceived 
differently depending on whether it applies inside or outside the territory of a state party.’121 
Turning to evaluating the separation model, I argue that it satisfies the success criteria. 
In its clearest form, the model is premised on the idea that the relational nature of human rights 
as opposed to other considerations should inform the meaning of jurisdiction. This means that 
the separation model focuses on the allocation of human rights obligations according to a 
state’s relationship with the individual in question, not the territory the individual happens to 
be found on. It follows that the separation model accounts well for the crucial connection of 
                                                 
118 Besson, supra note 16, at 863. 
119 This interpretation is also faithful, I believe, to her work on the nature of human rights more generally. See, 
e.g., Besson, supra note 66. 
120 Besson, supra note 16, at 863. 
121 Ibid., at 866. 
  
28 
the relational nature of human right and the allocation of obligations. It does so precisely by 
eliminating the confusing link with title to territory. This means that the separation model fits 
well with the relational nature of human rights postulated above. The result of this evaluation 
further elucidates the issues with the approximation and the differentiation models: it seems 
that title to territory, conceptually speaking, has too little in common with jurisdiction in 
international human rights law to contribute to the latter’s interpretation. In fact, after the 
evaluation of all three models using title in this way appears to be an attempt to square the 
circle. 
7. Conclusion 
This article has shown that, despite received wisdom to the contrary, title to territory continues 
to shape our understanding of jurisdiction in international human rights law. In order to show 
further that this should be avoided, it analysed the relationship of the two concepts. After 
considering a few examples pertaining to their potential connection, the article defined each of 
the concepts in line with their purpose. Jurisdiction was defined as a threshold criterion that 
triggers human rights obligations of states towards particular individuals and title described as 
a set of claims to territory that – at their heart – are designed to uphold minimal stability. Next 
the paper introduced three models of the relationship and evaluated them in light of their fit 
with the relational nature of human rights. The result of the evaluation was that the 
approximation and differentiation models – that is, those that maintain title’s influence on the 
interpretation of jurisdiction in various degrees – fail the success criterion, while the separation 
model satisfies it. 
The most important finding is thus that title to territory as understood in public 
international law cannot and ought not to inform the meaning of jurisdiction in international 
human rights law. This is significant as the implicit use of territorial conceptions of jurisdiction 
linger on in the reasoning of authors, and particularly the ECtHR even when the outcomes of 
their reasoning align with the separation model. In light of this it is safe to say that much of 
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what plagues the approaches taken by the ECtHR is based on these models lingering on as 
assumptions. The conflation of the various models introduced here means that the Court keeps 
falling back on notions such as that jurisdiction is ‘primarily territorial’ and thus has never fully 
arrived at an interpretation of jurisdiction that pays sufficient attention to the distinction 
between jurisdiction as right and jurisdiction as duty stressed above. 
It has not been the aim of this article to offer a new account of jurisdiction. Instead, the 
goal was to illuminate the relationship between jurisdiction in international human rights law 
and title to territory. This means that, in and of itself, the argument presented here does not aim 
to support or undermine any of the numerous interpretations of jurisdiction that have been 
proposed so far. However, the argument has implications for the limits of such accounts. In 
particular, I suggest that looking for guidance on jurisdiction in territorial notions should either 
be informed by the purpose of the former, or avoided entirely. 
Thus, the findings of this paper could be employed to avoid some of the shortcomings of 
the interpretation of jurisdiction in human rights treaties. This is true for the ECHR, where the 
debate is advanced and the arguments are sophisticated, but also for other instruments where 
the concept of jurisdiction has not yet been elaborated on in as much detail. Finally, and 
pertaining to international human rights law in general, approaches to jurisdiction that rely – 
even implicitly – on notions related to title to territory should be approached with caution and, 
where they subvert the purpose of jurisdiction as a justificatory tool for the allocation of human 
rights obligations, abandoned. 
